Action languages are formal models of parts of natural language that are designed to describe effects of actions. Many of these languages can be viewed as high level notations of answer set programs structured to represent transition systems. However, the form of answer set programs considered in the earlier work is quite limited in comparison with the modern Answer Set Programming (ASP) language, which allows several useful constructs for knowledge representation, such as choice rules, aggregates, and abstract constraint atoms. We propose a new action language called BC+, which closes the gap between action languages and the modern ASP language. The main idea is to define the semantics of BC+ in terms of general stable model semantics for propositional formulas, under which many modern ASP language constructs can be identified with shorthands for propositional formulas. Language BC+ turns out to be sufficiently expressive to encompass the best features of other action languages, such as languages B, C, C+, and BC. Computational methods available in ASP solvers are readily applicable to compute BC+, which led to an implementation of the language by extending system cplus2asp.

This paper continues the line of work on representing properties of actions in nonmonotonic formalisms that stresses the distinction between being "true" and being "caused", as in the system of causal logic introduced by McCain and Turner and in the action language C proposed by Giunchiglia and Lifschitz. The only fluents directly representable in language C+ are truth-valued fluents, which is often inconvenient. We show that both causal logic and language C can be extended to allow values from arbitrary nonempty sets. Our extension of language C, called C+, also makes it possible to describe actions in terms of their attributes, which is important from the perspective of elaboration tolerance. We describe an embedding of C+ in causal theories with multi-valued constants, relate C+ to Pednault's action language ADL, and show how multi-valued constants can be eliminated in favor of Boolean constants.

Counterfactual reasoning -- envisioning hypothetical scenarios, or possible worlds, where some circumstances are different from what (f)actually occurred (counter-to-fact) -- is ubiquitous in human cognition. Conventionally, counterfactually-altered circumstances have been treated as "small miracles" that locally violate the laws of nature while sharing the same initial conditions. In Pearl's structural causal model (SCM) framework this is made mathematically rigorous via interventions that modify the causal laws while the values of exogenous variables are shared. In recent years, however, this purely interventionist account of counterfactuals has increasingly come under scrutiny from both philosophers and psychologists. Instead, they suggest a backtracking account of counterfactuals, according to which the causal laws remain unchanged in the counterfactual world; differences to the factual world are instead "backtracked" to altered initial conditions (exogenous variables). In the present work, we explore and formalise this alternative mode of counterfactual reasoning within the SCM framework. Despite ample evidence that humans backtrack, the present work constitutes, to the best of our knowledge, the first general account and algorithmisation of backtracking counterfactuals. We discuss our backtracking semantics in the context of related literature and draw connections to recent developments in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI).

Our framework integrates a symbolic approach to represent causal law generation, with non-parametric Bayesian categorization to model latent categories, emphasizing the constructive nature of causal belief formation, in which both the content and extension of our causal concepts are generated rather than pre-specified. The constructive nature of the PCFG calls upon a potentially infinite set of possible causal functions, yet is governed by the preference for parsimony, and encourages systematic composition (see also Goodman et al., 2008; Bramley et al., 2018). The extended Dirichlet Process for category construction goes beyond a hierarchical Baysian modeling approach where categories are pre-defined as inductive biases (e.g. Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2009; Goodman et al., 2011), and thus better captures the flexibility of human generalization behaviors (see also Kemp et al., 2010). This method draws a close link with probabilistic program induction models (e.g.

We present a novel task that measures how people generalize objects' causal powers based on observing a single (Experiment 1) or a few (Experiment 2) causal interactions between object pairs. We propose a computational modeling framework that can synthesize human-like generalization patterns in our task setting, and sheds light on how people may navigate the compositional space of possible causal functions and categories efficiently. Our modeling framework combines a causal function generator that makes use of agent and recipient objects' features and relations, and a Bayesian non-parametric inference process to govern the degree of similarity-based generalization. Our model has a natural "resource-rational" variant that outperforms a naive Bayesian account in describing participants, in particular reproducing a generalization-order effect and causal asymmetry observed in our behavioral experiments. We argue that this modeling framework provides a computationally plausible mechanism for real world causal generalization.

We propose an approach based on Answer Set Programming for reasoning about actions with domain descriptions including ontological knowledge, expressed in the lightweight description logic EL^\bot. We consider a temporal action theory, which allows for non-deterministic actions and causal rules to deal with ramifications, and whose extensions are defined by temporal answer sets. We provide conditions under which action consistency can be guaranteed with respect to an ontology, by a polynomial encoding of an action theory extended with an EL^\bot knowledge base (in normal form) into a temporal action theory.

In previous work with Joost Vennekens I proposed a definition of actual causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that our definition is in fact a formalization of Wright's famous NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that our definition integrates two highly influential approaches to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify our definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken the difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids the problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach.

The idea is that although an AI system without the frame problem might, say, read an echocardiogram and diagnose a heart defect, a really smart autonomous robot will arrive only if, like us humans, it can handle the frame problem. The highlight … is an entertaining go-round between two pugilists trading blows in civil but gloves-off style, reminiscent of a net discussion. We're still confronted by a difficult question: Is there a solution to it? If not, then R2D2 might forever be but a creature of fiction. If, however, the frame problem is solvable, we must confront yet another question: Is there a general solution to the frame problem, or is the best that can be mustered a so-called domain-dependent solution?

Action languages are formal models of parts of natural language that are designed to describe effects of actions. Many of these languages can be viewed as high level notations of answer set programs structured to represent transition systems. However, the form of answer set programs considered in the earlier work is quite limited in comparison with the modern Answer Set Programming (ASP) language, which allows several useful constructs for knowledge representation, such as choice rules, aggregates, and abstract constraint atoms. We propose a new action language called BC+, which closes the gap between action languages and the modern ASP language. Language BC+ is defined as a high level notation of propositional formulas under the stable model semantics. Due to the generality of the underlying language, BC+ is expressive enough to encompass many modern ASP language constructs and the best features of several other action languages, such as B, C, C+ and BC. Computational methods available in ASP solvers are readily applicable to compute BC+, which led us to implement the language by extending system Cplus2ASP.

We present the language {m P}{cal C}+ for probabilistic reasoning about actions, which is a generalization of the action language {cal C}+ that allows to deal with probabilistic as well as nondeterministic effects of actions. We define a formal semantics of {m P}{cal C}+ in terms of probabilistic transitions between sets of states. Using a concept of a history and its belief state, we then show how several important problems in reasoning about actions can be concisely formulated in our formalism.